

# Group Notions of Knowledge


$S S_n$  Group of agents  $A = \{a, b, c, \dots\}$

$K_a \phi \quad (\equiv \Box_a \phi)$

$\hat{K}_a \phi \equiv \neg K_a \neg \phi$

↑  
Knowledge

it is consistent with a's  
knowledge that  $\phi$



Let  $B \subseteq A$ , where  $B$  is finite

$$E_B \phi \equiv \bigwedge_{b \in B} K_b \phi$$

↑  
 $b \in B$

"Everybody in  $B$  knows  $\phi$ "

$$E_B \phi = K_{b_1} \phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_{b_n} \phi$$

$$K_a \phi \rightarrow K_a K_a \phi$$

(4)

$$K_a K_a \phi \rightarrow K_a \phi$$

$$K_a \phi \rightarrow K_a K_a \phi$$

$$K_a \phi \rightarrow K_a^n \phi, n \geq 1$$

$$X^0 \phi = \phi$$

$$X = (K_a + \dots + K_a)^+$$

$$X^{n+1} \phi = X X^n \phi$$

$\exists_B \phi$   ~~$\rightarrow$~~   $\exists_B \exists_B \phi$

$r =$  "it rains in Otago"

$h$

$w$

$b$

$\exists$

.

.

$g$


$\exists_{hwb} r$

$\neg \exists_{hwb} \exists_{hwb} r$

.

$\exists$

Ex. 2.4 (Consecutive Numbers) a b



$E_{ab} \neg a_s \wedge$   
 $\neg E_{ab} E_{ab} \neg a_s$

← actual word

$$B = \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}$$

$$E_B \phi \rightarrow K_{b_1} \phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_{b_n} \phi$$

$$E_B E_B \phi \rightarrow K_{b_1} E_B \phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_{b_n} E_B \phi \rightarrow$$


$$K_{b_1} (K_{b_1} \phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_{b_n} \phi) \wedge \dots \wedge$$

$$K_{b_n} (K_{b_1} \phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_{b_n} \phi) \rightarrow$$

$$K_{b_1} K_{b_1} \phi \wedge K_{b_1} K_{b_2} \phi \wedge \dots \wedge K_{b_1} K_{b_n} \phi$$

$$\neg E_B^n \phi \equiv \hat{K}_{b_1} \dots \hat{K}_{b_n} \neg \phi \vee \dots$$

$$\hat{K}_{b_2} \dots \hat{K}_{b_n} \neg \phi \vee \dots \vee$$



# Common Knowledge

$C_B \phi$  = "it is common knowledge among the group of agents  $B$  that  $\phi$ " = "for every  $n \geq 0$ , it holds that  $E_B^n \phi$ "

$$C_B \phi \approx \bigwedge_{n \in \mathbb{N}} E_B^n \phi$$



Ex. 2.24  $p = \text{"Saint Nicholas does not exist"}$


$$F = \{a, b, c, \dots\}$$

$$K_a p \wedge \neg \exists F p$$

$$\exists F p \wedge \neg \exists F \exists F p$$

# Ex. 2.26 (Alco at the conference)

$$B = \{a, \dots\}$$



$$\in_B \phi \wedge \neg \in_B \in_B \phi$$

$$\neg \subset_B \phi$$

$$\in_B \phi \wedge \in_B \in_B \phi \wedge \neg \in_B \in_B \in_B \phi$$

$$\neg \subset_B \phi$$

Language with common Knowledge

$L_{KC}$


$\phi ::= p \mid \neg \phi \mid (\phi \wedge \phi) \mid K_a \phi \mid C_B \phi$

$p \in \Phi = \{\text{atomic prop}\}, a \in A, B \subseteq A$

$E_B \phi$  is a shortcut, so it is not necessary to add it in  $L_{KC}$

However  $C_B \phi$  must belong in  $L_{KC}$

# Ex 2.27 (Byzantine Generals)



a and b together can beat the enemy  
but only one of them will certainly  
lose

Assume that a wants to send to b  
the message  $m = \text{"I propose that we  
attack together at 1/4/2021, 8:00pm"}$

a

b

- If  $m$  successfully arrives to  $b$  then  $K_b m$  and  $K_b K_a m$ , but  $\neg K_a K_b m$
- Assume that  $b$ , after receiving  $m$  sends an acknowledgement to  $a$  and assume that the acknowledgement successfully arrives  
 $K_a K_b m$  but  $\neg K_b K_a K_b m$

By induction on  $n$  we can show the following: ( $n \in \mathbb{N}$ )


odd rounds: After  $2n+1$  successful messages (all but the first are acknowledgements)  $K_b (K_a K_b)^n m$  but  $\neg (K_a K_b)^{n+1} m$

even rounds: After  $2n+2$  successful messages (all but the first are acknowledgements)  $(K_a K_b)^{n+1} m$  is true but  $\neg K_b (K_a K_b)^{n+1} m$  is also true

Hence, common Knowledge cannot be established this way.

# Implicit/Distributed Knowledge

What all the agents in  $B$  know  
"together"





$K_a \phi =$  "a knows  $\phi$ "

$E_B \phi =$  "everybody in B knows  $\phi$ "

$D_B \phi =$  "a wise man know  $\phi$ " = "all together in B know  $\phi$ "


$C_B \phi =$  "it is common knowledge among the agents in B that  $\phi$ " = "every fool in B knows that  $\phi$ "

Semantics: We continue to have the same  $SS$  epistemic models, i.e.  $\langle S, \sim, V \rangle$

Definition. Let  $S$  be a set and  $\{R_b\}_{b \in B}$  is a set of binary relations in  $S$ .

$$\cdot R_{E_b} = \bigcup_{b \in B} R_b$$

$$\cdot R_{D_b} = \bigcap_{b \in B} R_b$$



The transitive closure of a relation  $R$  is a relation  $R^+$  such that

1  $R \subseteq R^+$

2  $(\forall x, y, z) (x R^+ y \wedge y R^+ z \Rightarrow x R^+ z)$

3.  $R^+$  is the smallest relation that satisfies 1 and 2

The reflexive transitive closure of a relation  $R$  is a relation  $R^*$  that satisfies 1-3 and also  $(\forall x) (x R^* x)$

$x \xrightarrow{R^*} y$  iff  $y$  is reachable  
from  $x$  using only  $R$ -steps

$x \xrightarrow{R} x_1 \xrightarrow{R} x_2 \dots \xrightarrow{R} y$

or


$x = y$

# Definition 2.30 (Truth for $L_{KC}$ -formulas)


Let  $M = (S, \sim, V)$  be an  $SS$ -model and  $s \in S$

$$\bullet M, s \models E_B \phi \iff (\forall t) (s R_{E_B} t \implies$$


$$(M, t) \models \phi)$$



$$\cdot M, s \models D_B \phi \Leftrightarrow (\forall t) [s R_{D_B} t \Rightarrow M, t \models \phi]$$



$$\cdot M, s \models C_B \phi \Leftrightarrow (\forall t) [s R_{E_B}^* t \Rightarrow M, t \models \phi]$$




$$C_B \phi \Rightarrow E_B \phi \Rightarrow K_a \phi \Rightarrow D_B \phi \Rightarrow \phi$$

$$a \in B \subseteq A$$

SSC is the class of SS  
models equipped with the  
definition of common knowledge  
truth

# Ex. 2.32 (Common Knowledge in Cons. Numbers)



$a$   $b$

$$M, (3, 2) \models \neg b_4 \wedge \neg E_{ab} \neg b_4$$

$$M, (3, 2) \models E_{ab} \neg a_5 \wedge \neg E_{ab} E_{ab} a_5$$

since

$$(3, 2) \xrightarrow{\text{blue}} (3, 4) \xrightarrow{\text{red}} (5, 4)$$

$$M, (3, 2) \models K_b K_a a_5$$

real word  $M, (3, 2) \models E_{ab} E_{ab} \neg b_6$   
 $\wedge \neg E_{ab} E_{ab} E_{ab} \neg b_6$

$$M, (3, 2) \models \neg C_{ab} \neg a_{1235}$$

$$M, (3, 2) \models C_{ab} \neg b_{1235}$$


$$M \models (a_3 \wedge b_2) \rightarrow (\neg C_{ab} \neg a_{1235} \wedge C_{ab} \neg b_{1235})$$



Example 2.33 (Possible Delay). It is a generalization of Byzantine Generals.

S: sender

R: receiver



when a message is sent it either arrives immediately or in the next time step

No beginning or end of time

$m =$  "the message that was sent was delivered"

"When will S and R have common knowledge of  $m$ ?" Spoiler Alert: Never!!!

states:  $(s_i, d_j)$  the message was sent at time  $i$  and delivered at time  $j$

The model  $M_K$  describes the knowledge after  $K$  time steps.

$$M_K, (s_i, d_j) \models m \text{ iff } j \leq K$$

We assume that  $m$  was sent at time 0 and delivered at time 0

$M_0$

$$\langle s_0, d_0 \rangle \xrightarrow{R} \langle s_{-1}, d_0 \rangle \xrightarrow{S} \langle s_{-1}, d_{-1} \rangle \xrightarrow{R}$$

$$\langle s_0, d_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{R} \langle s_1, d_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{S} \langle s_2, d_2 \rangle$$



$m$  states

$m$ -states

$$M_0, \langle s_0, d_0 \rangle \vdash m \wedge K_{R^m} \wedge \neg K_{S^m} \wedge \neg C_{SR^m}$$

$M_1$  is  $M_0$  where  $(s_0, d_0)$  is shifted 2 steps to the right

$$(s_1, d_1) \xrightarrow{R} (s_0, d_1) \xrightarrow{S} (s_0, d_0) \xrightarrow{R} (s_{-1}, d_0) \xrightarrow{R}$$

$$(s_1, d_2) \xrightarrow{R} (s_2, d_2) \xrightarrow{S} (s_2, d_3) \xrightarrow{R}$$

$M_k$  is the same as  $M_0$  with  $(s_0, d_0)$  shifted  $k+2$  positions to the right and also  $M_k, (s_k, d_{k+1}) \neq \neg m$

So,  $C_{SR^m}$  can NEVER be achieved