Section outline

    • Coercion Resistance: JCJ/Civitas και βελτιώσεις.
    • Τυπικοί Ορισμοί Verifiability.
    • Τυπικοί Ορισμοί Privacy: BPRIV.
    • Απόδειξη ότι το Helios διαθέτει weak verifiability.
    • Απόδειξη ότι το Belenios διαθέτει strong verifiability.
    • Απόδειξη ότι το Helios διαθέτει ballot privacy.

    Διαφάνειες

    Προτεινόμενη Μελέτη:

    • A. Juels, D. Catalano, and M. Jakobsson, “Coercion-resistant electronic elections,” in Proceedings of the 2005 ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES, 2005
    • Warren D. Smith. “New cryptographic voting scheme with best-known theoretical properties”. In: Frontiers in Electronic Elections. 2005.
    • J. Clark and U. Hengartner, “Selections: Internet Voting with Over-the Shoulder Coercion-Resistance,” in FC 2011.
    • Roberto Araújo, Sébastien Foulle, and Jacques Traoré. “A practical and secure coercion resistant scheme for remote elections”. In: Frontiers of Electronic Voting. 2007 
    • Steve Kremer, Mark Ryan, and Ben Smyth. “Election Verifiability in Electronic Voting Protocols”. In: ESORICS 2010.
    • Cortier, V., Galindo, D., Glondu, S., Izabachène, M. (2014). Election Verifiability for Helios under Weaker Trust Assumptions. ESORICS 2014.
    • Véronique Cortier and Ben Smyth, Attacking and fixing helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy, J. Comput. Secur. (2013), 89–148.
    • David Bernhard, Véronique Cortier, David Galindo, Olivier Pereira, and Bogdan Warinschi, Sok: A comprehensive analysis of game-based ballot privacy definitions, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2015, pp. 499–516.